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Key points 
New Zealand faces a huge fiscal cost from an ageing population… 
 Over the next few decades, the unprecedented impacts of an ageing 
population will put government finances under immense pressure.  
 Without significant changes in fiscal policy, government debt is projected to 
head towards 200% of GDP by 2060.  
 Clearly this is not feasible. Unpalatable change will be forced upon us by 
external lenders long before we get to that degree of debt.  
 But the underlying message is simple: we cannot afford the same spending 
patterns and tax settings as in the past. Something has to give, and we have 
to start thinking about the trade-offs sooner rather than later.   
…so we need to start making tough fiscal decisions now 
 New Zealand is in a good fiscal position to start contemplating these longer 
term challenges.  
 Recent efforts to get the books back in black after the Global Financial Crisis 
and the Christchurch earthquakes have been commendable. 
 But the focus needs to start moving away from concerns about short term 
vulnerability and towards preparing for the pressures of an ageing 
population.   
We have the room to make adjustments… 
 Our analysis shows that, relative to many of our OECD peers, we have 
ample flexibility to start lifting tax rates – over time – without taxation 
distorting the incentives to work and invest so much that revenue falls. 
 Of course, caution needs to be taken when determining the optimal level 
and rate of change of taxes. The evidence shows that overly high taxes can 
be harmful to economic growth. 
 In reality, we would expect fiscal adjustments to come about through a 
combination of lower government spending, broadening the tax base as 
well as lifting existing taxes.    
…and history shows our politicians do respond to increases in debt by 
adjusting taxes or spending 
 Looking back over a century, we show empirically that New Zealand 
governments have reacted to higher public debt levels by changing fiscal 
policy settings.  
 This – along with sound fiscal management in recent years – is a key reason 
why New Zealand doesn’t face the same accumulated structural imbalances 
that other countries (e.g. the US, some countries in the euro areas) are 
struggling with.  
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The sooner changes are made, the less chance that politics comes to 
dominate sound economics 
 The US and euro area experiences have shown that when necessary fiscal 
adjustments are postponed because they are politically unpopular in the 
short term, the medium to longer term corrections are economically painful 
and sub-optimal.  
 We recommend the New Zealand government starts the process of 
spreading out the huge costs of an ageing population as soon as possible. 
Initial options for the government to explore include: 
 Seeking a bipartisan agreement on meeting the costs of 
superannuation 
 Focusing the social safety net on those who need it most, rather than 
the middle class 
 Broadening the tax base to include a tax on land or a tax on capital 
gains  
 Better highlighting the choices of taxes and spending that are feasible 
for any given level of debt level over the next few decades so that 
Kiwis’ expectations can be better managed, and so that they start 
preparing themselves for a tighter fiscal future.        
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1. The costs of ageing have 
increased vulnerabilities 
The Global Financial Crisis has resulted in vulnerabilities in the short-run fiscal 
position of many advanced economies. Debt levels rose markedly. The risk of 
sovereign default increased the cost of borrowing for many countries. This change 
highlights the long-run vulnerabilities for most countries associated with funding the 
costs of ageing. That makes it critical to test the sustainability of any fiscal strategy. 
1.1. Blowout in many government debt 
positions 
After the crisis, most advanced economies are confronting the reality of long periods 
of restrained government spending to reduce debt levels (see Figure 1). Such long 
periods of reduced government spending carry serious costs that reduce growth and 
impact on the ability of government to redistribute income.  
Figure 1 Many advanced economies now face spending constraints to limit 
extended debt positions exacerbated by the Global Financial Crisis  
General government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP (OECD measure) 
 
Source: NZIER, OECD 
During the crisis, what many fiscal policymakers perceived to be sound balance 
sheets were quickly transformed into precarious positions in need of international 
assistance. So it is critical for governments to assess the risks and threats to the 
sustainability of fiscal commitments made today. 
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1.2. What New Zealand’s future debt looks like 
Figure 2 shows the paths for debt from successive long-term fiscal projections by the 
New Zealand Treasury. In the latest statement that uses the Long-Term Fiscal Model 
(LTFM) debt increases to 198 percent of GDP by 2060 – almost double what New 
Zealand produces in a year. 
Figure 2 Treasury consistently recognises future liabilities are unfunded 
Debt/GDP ratio. Forecasts are net debt excluding the Superfund from Long-term fiscal projections. 
Historical debt position is from the IMF long-term fiscal database (see Mauro et al. 2013)  
 
NB. The path for 2013 is interpolated based on data points (marked with crosses) from Treasury’s 
work that reports the debt level at ten-year intervals (see table 1, page 4 Treasury 2013, Affording 
our future). 
Source: The Treasury, NZIER 
Bell (2013) freezes the age composition of New Zealand’s population and asks what 
does the debt profile look like if New Zealanders don’t age? That frozen age scenario 
shows government debt would fall – so the future liabilities are entirely due to 
ageing.  
Treasury’s long-term fiscal projections are accounting models that simply add up 
liabilities based on a range of reasonable assumptions. Like other countries, these 
assumptions for future liabilities result in an explosive path for debt. That is a clear 
warning sign that change is required.  
Like previous long-term fiscal projections, the debt figures in Treasury’s Affording Our 
Future are not plans. Rather, the first section of Treasury’s work shows that without 
making fiscal adjustments, the costs of ageing mean New Zealand cannot afford its 
current policies – current policy settings are not fiscally sustainable.  
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1.3. How we define sustainability 
What do we mean by fiscal sustainability? There are several definitions: 
 “…having the ability to maintain or support government programmes in the 
future” (New Zealand Treasury 2013) 
 “…the ability of the government to meet both current and future obligations” 
(Barker 2008) 
 The IMF define debt sustainability as: “…whether a country’s debt can be 
serviced without an unrealistically large future correction in the balance of 
income and expenditure (IMF 2002).” 
We take fiscal sustainability to be the ability of government to fund current and 
future obligations, that is, whether revenue will be sufficient to meet planned 
expenditure.  
In general, to assess sustainability, countries face two key questions: 
 How responsive is fiscal policy to changes in the debt position? 
 How much flexibility – the room to shift fiscal settings like expenditure and 
taxation – exists? 
1.4. What we do in this paper 
This paper assesses fiscal sustainability for New Zealand. We take as given earlier 
work that shows how ageing will severely impact on the debt position of future 
governments (see for example, NZIER 2012, 2013a, 2013b and New Zealand Treasury 
2013). 
Section 2 lays out our framework for assessing sustainability and how we test for 
both flexibility and responsiveness. 
Section 3 shows the results of assessing the flexibility of taxation and expenditure 
settings. We use the Laffer curve approach of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011, 2012) to 
assess taxation settings and find New Zealand has sufficient flexibility to shift 
taxation settings. We also discuss options for adjusting expenditure. 
Section 4 first discusses results from Ostroy et al. (2010) that estimates New 
Zealand’s sustainable debt limit based on the past behaviour of governments using 
panel data. We extend their efforts to test for the responsiveness of fiscal policy to 
debt by estimating a fiscal reaction function for New Zealand based on a century of 
debt and budgets. We find New Zealand has sufficient responsiveness to debt. 
Finally, in Section 5 we summarise our assessment and draw some conclusions about 
how the debate about fiscal policy should be recast and the most fruitful areas for 
future research. 
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2. Our framework for assessing 
sustainability  
Our framework comprises two tests for fiscal sustainability. First, fiscal settings need 
to be sufficiently flexible to ensure today’s commitments are sustainable tomorrow. 
Second, fiscal policy needs to be sufficiently responsive to debt to ensure 
sustainability.  
We define a given debt level as sustainable if: 
i. the government demonstrates responsiveness, reducing debt by increasing 
the primary balance; 1 and  
ii. the government has the flexibility to change taxation and expenditure 
settings to change the primary balance.    
2.1. How we test if tax settings have sufficient 
flexibility 
To ensure sustainability a requisite for government is to move the primary balance, 
that is, revenue minus spending, but excluding financing costs. Here, like elsewhere 
(see Leeper and Walker 2011, Trabandt and Uhlig 2011, 2012 and Park 2012), we 
take the government’s expenditure as given and test the efficacy of raising tax rates 
to increase tax revenue and thus close the primary balance. 
Countries with high consumption and labour taxes can find that increasing taxation 
rates is counter-productive. Typically revenue increases as taxation increases. But as 
taxation rates move ever higher, firms and workers have very little incentive to work 
and reduce activity so that taxation revenue falls. 
The Laffer curve maps tax revenue against taxation rates and shows that increasing 
taxation rates from zero increases total revenue but ultimately total revenue starts to 
fall when higher and higher tax rates reduce the incentive to work (see Figure 3).2 So 
any country needs to be on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve to 
increase taxation in response to shocks so that debt remains manageable.3 Trabandt 
and Uhlig (2011, 2012) estimate the Laffer curves for the US and a range of euro area 
countries. We replicate their work for New Zealand. 
 
                                                                
1  The primary balance is government revenue minus government spending (excluding financings 
costs). 
2  The location of the peak is ultimately an empirical question – Stuart (1981) suggests a peak of 70 
percent for the case of Sweden, which is used illustratively in Figure 1. 
3
  This approach is entirely consistent with Leeper and Walker (2011) who define the debt limit as 
the point beyond which adjustments in tax rates alone cannot stabilise government debt. 
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Figure 3 Laffer curves map tax against revenue, peaking where revenue declines 
Stylised Laffer curve representation, taxation is the average taxation rate from all sources 
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Source: NZIER 
Being on the upward-sloping part of the Laffer curve is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for sustainability. While governments might have the flexibility to return 
debt to sustainable levels, governments might not have the political will to 
implement the sets of policies required to return debt to manageable levels, for 
example, increasing income taxes. 
Therefore, in order to assess New Zealand’s fiscal sustainability, we augment our 
tests of fiscal flexibility. Governments concerned with extended debt positions will 
increase the primary balance to reduce debt. That means we can test for fiscal 
responsiveness by estimating a fiscal reaction function that relates the primary 
balance to debt. 
Of course, to change the primary balance, governments can also adjust expenditure. 
So we also discuss flexibility on the expenditure side of the ledger, identifying specific 
policies that warrant closer attention.   
2.2. How we test if fiscal policy is sufficiently 
responsive 
Even though governments may have the tools to return debt to manageable levels, 
when debt is very high, the costs of reducing debt can be large. 
The recent US shutdown of many federal programmes has been hard on government 
employees, sapping consumer confidence and creating uncertainty in financial 
markets. When the costs of adjustment increase, politics can trump the right 
economic course of action. For example, the US needs to decrease spending and 
increase taxation to control the future level of US debt – but neither option is 
politically attractive. 
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But by looking at how past governments have responded to rising debt levels, we can 
assess New Zealand’s fiscal sustainability based on the responsiveness of government 
to rising debt limits over history.  
That means using data on macroeconomic conditions to estimate a fiscal reaction 
function. This can then be used to assess how close current debt is to sustainable 
debt limits.4,5 
Bohn (1995, 1998, 2005) estimates fiscal reaction functions to assess the 
sustainability of the US debt position. Bohn (1998) uses the behaviour of previous US 
governments over the past three centuries to estimate the sustainable debt level, 
beyond which the political costs of increasing the balancing the budget become 
simply too large. His earlier work suggests that point is not likely to bind very soon – 
the US appears to have ample room to respond based on the fiscal reaction function 
approach.  
Ostroy et al. (2010) extend Bohn’s (1998, 2005) approach by incorporating estimates 
of debt limits that take into account the costly adjustment that governments may 
have to make to return debt to sustainable levels. These adjustments may be very 
large and governments may lack the will, or as the shutdown of many federal 
programmes in the US shows, the political mandate to exact these policies.  
Simply having the tools in the toolkit is not enough to ensure sustainability. 
Governments have to be willing to increase taxation revenue or reduce spending 
when debt increases. That makes for our responsiveness test of the sustainability 
of a particular fiscal position: if the government responds to debt in the same 
manner as history, will the path of debt explode or is it manageable and will 
reduce to lower levels?  
This approach was developed by Bohn (1998) who found that three centuries of 
US data showed that the US debt position was sustainable based on how fiscal 
policy had responded to debt in the past. Bohn (1998) suggests “The most credible 
evidence in favour of sustainability is the robust positive response of primary 
surpluses to fluctuation in the debt-to-GDP ratio”. 
Box A shows the relationship between debt and the primary balance.  
We then present our empirical results in the next two chapters. Chapter 3 
assesses New Zealand’s fiscal flexibility. Chapter 4 considers New Zealand’s fiscal 
responsiveness to debt. 
  
                                                                
4  We use the ratio of government debt-to-GDP as our standard measure. 
5
  Sustainability is often interpreted as a one-for-one match with solvency. But the interest rate costs 
of debt are a real cost that reduces what governments can spend on education, health and 
infrastructure and other government expenditure. That can make it important to separate the costs 
of solvency from the costs of debt servicing when estimating fiscal reaction functions (see discussion 
in Mendoza and Ostroy 1994 and Ghosh et al. 2013). 
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Box A: Does the budget respond to debt? 
A robust test for fiscal responsiveness 
One simple test for fiscal sustainability centres on how the primary balance is set in 
response to changes in the debt level.  
Changes in the primary balance directly impact on future debt. So, if the government 
is serious about reducing debt, then revenue minus spending should rise in response 
to increases in the debt position. 
To show this relationship Bohn (1995) and others (Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa 
2012, Pradelli 2012) start with the accounting identity for the public debt stock: 
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expresses next period’s debt-to-GDP ratio   , as last period’s debt, the primary 
balance      , and the so-called “snowball effect”. The snowball effect shows that 
the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio is not simply a function of existing debt 
combined with the deficit, but is partly determined by nominal growth.  
But equation (3) shows clearly the relationship between the revenue minus spending 
and the change in the debt to GDP ratio. This makes for a straightforward test of the 
responsiveness of fiscal policy: does the primary balance respond to changes in debt. 
Bohn (1995) applies this test to three centuries of US data and finds in favour of the 
responsiveness of policy using an error correction approach. Others have used the 
same framework across a range of counties (for example, Cunado et al 2004 for a 
fractional integration approach to the US fiscal deficit, Kia 2008 applies the 
framework to Iraq and Turkey while Konings and van Arle 2011 look at the case of 
Belgium). 
Other approaches include Ostroy et al. (2010) who leverage and then extend Bohn’s 
(1995) approach by adjusting for the interest cost of debt. We use this approach to 
examine the case of New Zealand in Section 4. 
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3. Assessing fiscal flexibility 
Fiscal flexibility requires the room to adjust taxation and expenditure settings so that 
the level of debt is manageable and the government can meet the commitments it 
makes now and in the future. We compare the flexibility of New Zealand’s taxation 
settings against the United States and euro area countries using a simple model. We 
find that New Zealand has ample fiscal flexibility: taxes can adjust to increase the 
primary balance if required. We also discuss the flexibility of government 
expenditure. 
3.1. How flexible are New Zealand’s tax 
settings? 
To compute the Laffer curves for New Zealand we use the neoclassical model of 
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). That model (see Appendix A) is useful since it provides a 
direct comparison of the method with a range of other countries including the US 
and euro area countries.6 
Our method is the following: 
 use data to determine New Zealand’s steady-state – the long-run or 
equilibrium model properties, including labour’s share of income, the 
elasticity of labour supply and government’s share of output 
 calibrate and solve the model for rules that map tax changes to tax revenue 
 trace out the Laffer curve by moving taxes from 0 to 100 percent 
 calculate fiscal flexibility by comparing the peak of the Laffer curve to existing 
labour and capital taxation rates. 
Figure 4 shows the Laffer curves for capital taxation for a selection of countries 
provided by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) notes that it is 
labour and consumption taxes that generate cross-country differences in Laffer 
curves. 
We calculate the Laffer curves for New Zealand by calibrating a model of the 
economy and simulating tax revenue when taxation rates change.  
Our results show that while the peak of the Laffer curve for capital taxation is lower 
than for other countries (denoted with an ‘x’ at 0.60 cents in the dollar) New Zealand 
still has ample room to raise capital taxes relative to current taxation (denoted with a 
circle). 
                                                                
6  See Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) for the data methodology and Appendix A for the model we adopt to trace 
out the curve. That approach uses a variety of international databases to calculate taxation rates. Including 
supplements to wage income (like social security for the United States) and a fraction of taxation on 
entrepreneurial income, shifts labour taxation higher for most countries. 
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Figure 4 New Zealand has ample flexibility to adjust capital taxation higher 
Cross-country capital taxation Laffer curve comparison using the Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) model 
 
Circles show average taxation position over 1995-2010, crosses show the Laffer curve peak 
Source: NZIER, Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) 
Importantly, Figure 4 says nothing about what is the optimal rate of capital taxation. 
Instead, Figure 4 identifies the extent to which taxation can act as a lever to increase 
revenue and reduce debt. 
Figure 5 shows the cross-country Laffer curves for labour taxation. The comparisons 
show that some countries, Greece for example, have limited flexibility to increase 
revenue via labour taxation to help reduce debt.  
Figure 5 New Zealand has ample flexibility to adjust labour taxation higher 
Cross-country labour taxation Laffer curve comparison using the Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) model 
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Circles show average taxation position over 1995-2010, crosses show the Laffer curve peak 
Source: NZIER, Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) 
Figure 5 shows that if required, New Zealand has ample flexibility to manage shocks. 
Labour taxation can increase to boost revenue if necessary. Arithmetically, taxation 
rates could increase to 62 percent before reducing taxation revenue. 
Like the case of capital taxation rates, the Laffer curve says nothing about the optimal 
rate of labour taxation or how taxes affect economic growth. 
The revenue from taxation revenue helps provide public goods and redistribute 
income for equity purposes. 
But the evidence is clear – higher rates of taxation reduce the incentive to work, 
lower savings and crimp innovation and entrepreneurship (see OECD 2010, for 
example) within the economy. So there is a trade-off – too much debt risks economic 
growth, and higher taxation rates also reduce economic growth. 
Our work focuses on adjustments to capital and labour taxation only. Broadening the 
tax base, such as implementing a tax on land or a tax on capital gains, is also worthy 
of close consideration. 
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3.2. How flexible is expenditure? 
The reality is much government expenditure is political rather than flexible. But 
Figure 6 shows the costs of ageing produce a dramatic increase in many key 
expenditure groups by 2060 as a fraction of GDP.7 So either tax needs to rise 
dramatically, or we need to cut expenditure – we can’t continue to do everything. 
Figure 6 Ageing increases the share of GDP allocated to key government 
expenditure items  
Source: NZIER, New Zealand Treasury 
Two measures that look worthy of further investigation are: 
 removing interest free student loans 
 better targeting welfare payments to those most in need. 
It is far from clear that interest free student loans deliver improvement in tertiary 
educational attainment.8 Since the interest bill on the outstanding stock of loans 
could be as much as $500 million each year, the policy looks like questionable use of 
public money (see de Raad 2011) that might be spend elsewhere such as early 
childhood education or heath care.   
New Zealand’s Working for Families policy has reduced child poverty but our earlier 
analysis (see Zeng and de Raad 2011) suggests this package is very poorly targeted – 
middle-class earners pick up most of the spending. Reallocating this spending 
towards lower income families would provide better value-for-money. 
Ultimately we need to find agreement to change either spending or taxation to 
ensure the policy commitments made today endure. 
                                                                
7
  These figures are from the 2013 Budget Statement and New Zealand Treasury (2013). 
8  The Ministry of Education (2010) note: “The Participation in tertiary education by domestic students has declined since 
2005, but despite this, the number of eligible students actually borrowing from the loan scheme has increased steadily over 
this period. The rise is largely due to the introduction of the interest-free loans policy from 2006 onwards.” So the 
availability of interest-free student loans is unlikely to have materially lifted participation in tertiary study. 
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4. Assessing the responsiveness 
of fiscal settings 
Fiscal sustainability requires not just the tools to adjust the primary balance (i.e. 
flexibility of taxation and expenditure settings) but the ambition and willingness of 
government to adjust budgets in response to increasing debt. We use the historical 
responsiveness of government to pin down a debt limit beyond which government is 
unlikely to be able to balance the budget. Above this limit debt dynamics become 
explosive. We estimate such a debt limit and find that New Zealand has ample room 
before debt becomes unmanageable. 
4.1. Does Government have the will to 
respond? 
Ostroy et al. (2011) note empirical evidence (Abiad and Ostroy 2005 and 
Mendoza and Ostroy 2008) that suggests the responsiveness of the budget to 
debt is weaker at high levels of debt. And the cost of borrowing typically 
increases at high debt levels.  
Figure 7 illustrates their approach to estimating debt limits. They map the budget 
(adjusted for financing costs, the real interest rate and growth rate of the 
economy) against the debt-to-GDP ratio. Their approach endogenises the private 
sector’s response to rising debt-to-GDP levels – adding an interest rate schedule 
with endogenous risk.  
So when debt levels are high (above   ̂ in the figure) each additional unit of debt 
requires additional increases in revenue minus spending to finance increased 
debt servicing costs across the entire stock of debt. If there is no additional 
premium imposed by the private sector at high debt levels then the debt limit can 
be high (at  ̃ in Figure 7). The stable debt ratio, labelled d*, shows the level that 
debt converges to in the long-run when the government moves the primary 
balance in response to debt.  
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Figure 7 The estimated debt limit shows New Zealand’s fiscal policy is responsive  
Primary balance=Government revenue – government spending less debt servicing 
 
Source: Ostroy et al. (2011) 
Ostroy et al. (2011) use data from 1970-2007 from 23 countries to estimate fiscal 
reaction functions that include a nonlinear response to debt.  
They use panel data to estimate the responsiveness of the primary balance to: 
 lagged debt 
 the output gap  
 trade openness  
 inflation  
 age dependency. 
Prior to the Christchurch earthquake, they report (shown in Figure 7) a 
sustainable debt limit of a projected 186.4 percent of GDP. Net core crown debt 
was estimated at 27.1 percent of GDP in the May 2013 budget So based on the 
past responsiveness of fiscal policy, New Zealand appears to have ample room.  
Ostroy et al. (2011) note that among the countries they look at, Australia, 
Denmark, Korea, New Zealand and Norway generally have the most room to deal 
with shocks while Greece, Italy, Japan and Ireland have the least room between 
the estimated debt limit and where debt is expected to be in 2015. Table 1 shows 
some of the results against selected OECD peers. 
  
Interest rate schedule with
endogenous risk
Primary balance
reaction function
(r(p)-g)d (r(0)-g)d
NZ: d*=0 d^ d
~
Debt/GDP
Debt limitStable debt
ratio
Risk-free
interest rate
Primary
balance
(adjusted for real interest
minus growth rate)
NZ: d=186
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Table 1 Australia and New Zealand are well-positioned relative to OECD peers 
Based on projected 2015 debt level 
Country Debt 2015 Stable debt d* Debt limit d’ 
Australia 20.9 0.0 193.2 
Canada 71.2 82.6 181.1 
Greece 158.6 n/a n/a 
Ireland 94.0 90.7 149.7 
United Kingdom 90.6 94.9 166.5 
United States 109.7 101.0 160.5 
New Zealand 36.1 0.0 186.4 
Source: Ostroy, Ghosh, Kim and Qureshi (2011) 
What should we think about the massive gap between New Zealand’s current 
debt level and the debt limit in Table 1? The Government is at no risk of 
immediate default. This is not surprising. The New Zealand Government has 
never defaulted to foreign investors over its relatively short history.9 
Many commentators are concerned about New Zealand’s highly negative Net 
Foreign Asset position. But international investors have been prepared to finance 
New Zealand’s current account deficit for decades. And the revised Net Foreign 
liabilities position is not large compared to history. New Zealand’s current public 
debt position will not trigger a default any time soon. 
So there is ample room to move on debt and our short-term vulnerabilities have 
eased. It is time to focus attention on the required adjustment to the rising costs 
of ageing. 
4.2. A century of data, a century of responding 
to debt 
To dig deeper into the New Zealand case we use the hundred years of data from the 
IMF long-run debt database (see Mauro et al. 2013). 
That data shows New Zealand has a long history as an indebted country (see Figure 
8). New Zealand’s pioneering history established a tradition of loans from the United 
Kingdom to finance a developing country. Indeed, much of government expenditure 
was in the form of financing loans to private developers to provide infrastructure 
across New Zealand. 
Debt was high – at 100 percent of GDP prior to World War I and peaking at 226 
percent of GDP in 1933 – when weak foreign and domestic demand collapsed 
incomes at the height of the great depression. 
                                                                
9  Reddell (2012) recounts the 1933 Government debt restructure that imposed lower interest 
rates on domestic holders of New Zealand Government debt, although it is hard to see this 
event as an outright default. 
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New Zealand was able to avoid outright default with favourable financing terms on 
some loans from Britain helping keep costs of borrowing relatively low given the level 
of indebtedness (see Figure 8 and Reddell 2012 for more discussion). 
After World War II debt declined slowly over the 1950s and 1960s to 43 percent of 
GDP in 1973. Debt increased again through the 1970s when revenue failed to keep 
up with expenditure even when stripping out debt financing (see Figure 10). 
Debt continued to decline through the 1990s and most of the 2000s. Some of this 
decline might be attributable to the 1994 Public Finance Act that introduced regular 
fiscal reporting including budget policy statements to increase fiscal transparency.  
The most recent years show the impact of the Global Financial Crisis weakening 
demand (see Figure 11) and the impact of the Christchurch earthquakes on the 
government balance sheet. 
We use this history to detect the extent to which budgets respond to debt expressed 
as a fraction of GDP. 
We also test the extent to which fiscal policy responds to or is unrelated to the 
business cycle. We expect budgets to be at least positively related to the cycle since 
revenue increases in good times and expenditure falls. 
More technically we use the primary balance – government revenue minus 
government spending (excluding financing costs) in our regression so that,     : 
                         [
       
      
 
    
   
]     ( ) 
where       is the primary balance from the previous year, (see Figure 9),        is 
last year’s business cycle and the term [
       
      
 
    
   
] is last period debt-to-GDP 
ratio relative to a target for debt. 
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Figure 8 New Zealand’s debt has declined after the  
second world war 
Net debt/GDP ratio 
 
Source: IMF long-run debt dataset, Statistics New Zealand 
Figure 9 Global Financial Crisis and earthquakes dent 
the primary balance 
Primary balance as a fraction of GDP 
 
Source: Treasury, NZIER 
Figure 10 Debt servicing costs have declined steadily 
since the early 1990s 
Debt servicing costs as a fraction of GDP 
 
Source: IMF long run database, Statistics New Zealand 
 
Figure 11 The great depression shows through clearly 
in our output gap measure 
Hodrick-Prescott filtered output gap (λ=400) 
 
Source: IMF long run database, Statistics New Zealand 
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Table 2 shows our results. The size of the primary balance is sticky. Since this year’s 
spending and taxation decisions are closely related to last year’s decisions the size of 
the primary balance will be similar to the year before. 
The primary balance does not appear to respond strongly to the business cycle. The 
last row of the table shows that we should expect governments of the future to 
respond to rising debt by adjusting fiscal settings. 
Table 2 Our results show New Zealand governments responded to debt over history 
Results based on yearly data for 1913-2012. 
Parameter Estimate p-value Interpretation 
   0.861 (0.001) The primary balance is sticky. 
   0.032 (0.641) The primary balance doesn’t respond to the cycle. 
   0.034 (0.071) The primary balance responds to debt. 
Source: NZIER 
Over the past century, successive governments have changed fiscal policy to return 
debt to sustainable levels.  
To test how the responsiveness of fiscal policy has changed over successive decades 
and regimes, we estimate a time-varying version of equation (1) over successive 
rolling windows of forty years. Figure 12 shows the responsiveness of the primary 
balance to debt changed over time but is positive through the entire period – New 
Zealand governments generally adjust the primary balance when debt gets too high. 
Figure 12 New Zealand ramped up the response to debt since the 1970s  
 
Source: NZIER 
After a period of negative terms-of-trade shocks when the price of oil increased in 
the early 1970s, fiscal policy was relatively active and discretionary through the 
1970s and 1980s (see Janssen 2001, for example). Figure 11 shows that the response 
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to debt ebbed to almost zero in the early 1970s but then recovered in the latter part 
of the 1970s after the main impact of the terms-of-trade shocks had dissipated. 
Our estimates suggest a material impact of three pieces of legislation that helped 
consolidate the debt position (see Janssen 2001): 
 the State-owned Enterprises (SOE) Act 1986 that helped reduce costs and 
increase revenue from government services that could be commercialised 
 the State Sector Act 1988 (SSA) that increased accountability for 
performance of the state sector 
 the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA) that required governments to set both 
short- and long-term objectives.  
The primary balance then responds to debt increases in the mid-to-late 1990s before 
declining from the late 1990s due to tax cuts (see Parkyn 2010, for example).  
Fiscal policy generally does the right thing in terms of managing debt. But while 20 
percent of GDP seems like a reasonable target given New Zealand’s current debt 
servicing costs it is the future costs of today’s plans that are the metric to assess 
sustainability. 
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5. Conclusion 
What our work shows 
Right now, New Zealand’s government debt stands at 26.3 percent of GDP – low 
compared to many OECD countries. Our work demonstrates that the debt position 
and the flexibility to move taxes means the New Zealand government’s balance sheet 
is in good stead to withstand future shocks regardless of whether they originate from 
our key trading partners or domestically.  
While many other countries face difficult decisions to manage precarious balance 
sheets in risk of default, the Government is unlikely to default on debt obligations. 
Instead, the cost of financing the future costs of ageing should motivate putting in 
place policies that mean we can afford tomorrow the commitments made today. 
Our work with 100 years of data shows that New Zealand governments do respond – 
the primary balance increases when debt rises. So expect future changes in 
expenditure and taxation as ageing starts to crimp what we can afford as a nation. 
So what does government need to do? 
What governments can do is better articulate how today’s commitments will be 
afforded in the future. That reduces uncertainty for decision-making by both 
households and firms, promoting better outcomes. 
Much of the recent debate on New Zealand’s fiscal policy settings has centred on 
vulnerabilities and the risk of default. But we show current debt levels are 
sustainable and the risk of default is low as: 
 the government has the policy levers to make the necessary adjustments 
 history shows to expect the government to respond to increasing debt by 
making the necessary adjustments to raise the primary balance.  
This means it is appropriate to recast fiscal policy debate away from short run 
vulnerability and squarely onto fiscal policies that close the long-run structural gap 
between expenditure and revenue, such as reducing the costs of superannuation. 
Articulating a plan early helps workers and businesses plan for future scenarios, 
reducing uncertainty about the types of interventions that might be required. 
Developing the plan sooner rather than later will reduce the risk of the political costs 
of change rising too far. As the US experience shows, high political costs can cause 
severe economic problems. 
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Appendix A Neoclassical model 
The equations below outline the standard neoclassical model used to calculate the 
Laffer curves in Figures 5 and 6. 
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where    denotes output,   is total factor productivity, and   denotes capital share in 
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which can be used to generate Laffer curves as in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and Park 
(2012): 
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